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ABSTRACT
Thispaper summarizes a number of studies which use patent data to
examine different aspects of technological change.It describes our finn
leveldata set construction effort; reports on the relationship between R&D
expenditures and the level of patenting; analyzes the relationship between
patents, R&D, and the stock market value of firms; reports on the estimation
of the value of patent rights based on European patent renewal data; and
describes the use of patent data to estimate the importance of R&D spillovers.
Itconcludes that patent data represent a valuable resource for the analysis
of technological change. They canbeused to study longer-run interfirm
differences in inventive activity andas a substitutefor R&D data where they
are not available in the desired detail. It is possible also to use a firm's
distribution of patenting by field to infer its position in "technological
space"and use it in turn tostudy how R&Dspills over from one firm toanother.
Moreover,patent renewal data, which are also becoming available in the U.S.,
allow one to construct more relevant "quality weighted" inventive t•outputu
measures.
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1. Introduction
In this paper we present an overview of a series of studiespursued at
the NBER during the last decade which used patent statistics tostudy
different aspects of the economics of technological change. It consists of
five substantive sections: A description of our firm level data;a report
on the relationship between R&D expenditures and the level of patenting; a
report on the relationship between patents, the stock market value of
firms, and their R&D expenditures; a summary of work on the estimation of
the value of patent rights based on patent renewal data; anda description
of the use of patent data to estimate the importance of R&Dspillovers. A
brief set of conclusions closes the paper.
2. The NBER-R&D Data Base and the Growth of U.S. Firms in the 1970s
A major achievement of the NBER project has been the development and
construction of a large data set covering the economic and technological
performance of most of publicly traded U.S. manufacturing companies from
the early 1960s through the early 1980s. It is the result of a detailed
match of publicly available sales, employment, investment, R&D, and balance
sheet information from the Compustat tapes (based on company 10-K filings
with the SEC) with data acquired from the U.S. Patent Office onpatents
issued to all organizations between 1969 and 1982. Three major tasks had
to be accomplished to make these data useable: (1) The Patent Office data
1on the number of patents granted to various organizations had to be matched
with our list of manufacturing corporations.(2) The balance sheet items
in the Compustat record had to be converted from historical to either
current replacement or constant dollar prices. And (3) detailed sales
price indexes had to be imported into these files to allow the computation
of output and productivity measures for these companies.
To assemble our data set we started with the population of firms
listed in the 1978 Compustat Industrial Tape, to which we added those firms
that still existed in 1976 from the Research Tape, firms in the Compustat
Over-the-Counter tape and firms in the Compustat Full Coverage tape. This
yielded an approximate total of 2700 manufacturing firms in 1976.(See
Cummins et al, 1985 and sound, et al, 1984 for a description of this
sample and the Appendix for more detail on on the match procedures). We
then matched to this firm data set the detailed information on patents
granted from the Office of Technology Assessment and Forecast (OTAF) tapes
and found that approximately two-thirds of these firms received at least
one patent between 1969 and 1982.
A preliminary analysis of aggregate trends in these data revealed
changing lags due to fluctuations in the delays at the Patent Office in
processing the applications. Because patents are recorded by date granted
while we are interested, primarily, in patent counts by date of
application, such delays have implications for the completeness of our
series in the later years.
Table 1 provides a distribution of U.S. patents by date granted and by
date applied for and shows both the degree of completeness of the data at
any point of time and the fluctuations in the lag between the application
2— 2a—
Table 1
The Distribution of Patents Applied for by
Year of Application, 1970—1982, and Time to Year of Grant
Percent Granted Total in
Year of Years Later Current
Application 0 1 2 3 4 5+ Panel**
1969 0 11 66 20 2 1 100
1970 0 18 62 17 2 1 100
1971 0 17 61 18 2 2 100
1972 0 28 57 11 2 2 100
1973 0 37 50 10 2 1 100
1974 1 42 48 6 2 1. 100
1975 1 42 46 8 1 2 100
-1976 2 42 47 6 2 2 100
1977 1 42 41 12 2 2 99
1978 1 24 57 15 2 1 99
1979 0 22 60 15 2 1 97
0 22 53 20 3 2 75
0 17 50 27 * * 17
1982 0 15 52 * * * Q
1969—70 based on a sample of 100,000 patents from the 1969—79 OTAF tape on patents






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 any point of time and the fluctuations in the lag between the application
and granting dates. About 97 percent of all patent applicationswhich will
be ultimately granted are granted within the first fouryears of the
application date (but only about 70 to 80 percent are granted within the
first three years). Hence, our sample of patents by date ofapplication
extends effectively only through 1979.
In Bound et al (1984) we looked primarily at the cross-sectional
aspect of these data. We found that about two-thirds of our sample were
granted at least one patent between 1965 and 1979 and that the smaller
firms (less than ten million dollars in sales) account for a slightly
larger fraction of patents than of R&D or sales. The industries with a
higher than average ratio of patents to R&D were the chemical, drug,
petroleum, engine, farm and construction machinery, electrical equipment,
and aircraft industries. Although technology based, firms in the
communications equipment and computer industries patent less than the
average of firms doing the same amount of R&D. (See Table 2.)
Turning to the scale question, we found very little evidence that
larger firms or firms doing more R&D were more productive in patenting
(Figure 1). The answer to this question is clouded by conflicting results
from alternative specifications of the relationship of patenting to R&D and
by the sheer diversity of the firms in our sample. For the larger firms in
our sample patenting is approximately proportional to R&D. The smallest
fins do seem to show somewhat more patenting per R&D dollar but they are a
far more selected group, owing to the way we chose the sample. (A small
firm has to be in some sense more than usually successful to be listed on

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 To look at time series aspects of our data, we have focused on a sub-
sample of manufacturing firms (excluding foreign-owned firms and wholly-
owned subsidiaries) which (1) existed in 1976 and (2) had at least three
years worth of good data on our major variables of interest: sales, book
value, and market value. This yielded a subset of about 1900 firms for
which we have constructed detailed market value data and revalued their
physical assets in current prices. About 1600 of them have data on sales,
market value, and book value of plant for the eight year period 1972-1980.
They accounted for about one trillion dollars of sales in 1976 and employed
approximately sixteen million workers. Although we sacrifice the pre-1972
history of R&D for some of these firms in enlarging the sample, this sample
is more representative of the whole of u.S. manufacturing and we have the
complete patenting history since about 1967 for these firms. They account
for about fifteen billion dollars of R&D in 1976 (approximately 88 percent
of the total of company-financed R&D reported by the National Science
Foundation) and received about nineteen thousand patents -Theseare the
basic data that were used subsequently by us in various analyses of market
value, R&D, patenting, and productivity. They were recently updated to
1981-1982 and the Quarterly Compustat Tape was used to recompute market
values and the stock market rate of return for the fiscal rather than the
calendar year to make these variables more comparable to the other data in
the record.
Table 3 gives some more information on this panel. If we want
consistent and continuous data from 1972 through 1980, we have relatively
"clean" data on 968 fins, 525 of which were performing R&D consistently


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 out from this table: (1) The R&D firms bothgrew faster throughout this
period, in terms of employment, and had a higher growth inproductivity,
deflated sales per employee, than non-R&D firms. And(2), there is much
variation across industries in this experience.Employment in R&D
performing firms grew at about two percent peryear while non-R&D firms
were almost not growing at all (0.2 percent per year).
If one looks at the same numbers industryby industry, the results are
less clear. Only in three out of the eight industries wherecomparisons
can be made, was the growth in average employment unequivocallyhigher for
R&D firms. Nevertheless, this implication is confirmedby a more detailed
look at the growth in employment of individual firmsduring the 1976-79
period by Bronwyn Hall (1985). For a larger sample of 1524 firms she finds
that employment growth is related positively andsignificantly to R&D
intensity (the logarithm of R&D expenditures per employee in 1976) witha
coefficient of 0.018 (0.03) and moreover, that the effect ofan R&D dollar
on employment growth is higher than of a similar conventional investmentin
physical assets. Inclusion of 20 industry dummy variables andan
adjustment for selective mortality between 1976 and 1979 leave these
conclusions unchanged.
Another interesting aspect of Table 3 is its indication that the
overall industry growth rates (of both employment andproductivity) are
lower than the average rates experienced by the firms inour sample. In
part this reflects the selectivity of our sample. To be present in 1976 a
firm,otherthings equal, must have been growing faster before 1976. To
survive to 1980 also required above average growth. These issues of
selective mortality have been investigated by Addanki (1986) and Hall
5(1985). Addanki shows that firms that exited between 1976 and 1984 were
small on average and less R&D intensive, though with slightly more patents
per R&D dollar. The major difference between the numbers at the aggregate
and the firm levels arises from differences in weighting. Because the firm
level averages are unweighted, they are dominated by the small firms which
survived throughout the whole period. They did indeed grow faster (see
Hall, 1985). The average firm in the sample was, therefore, during this
period growing faster than the corres-ponding industry total.
The data sets we have constructed contain a large number of
interesting variables only some of which have been explored in our own
work. The major available variables are: Cross and net value of plant in
historical, constant, and current prices, total sales in current and
constant prices, operating income, dividends, market value of the firm,
number of employees, investment and R&D expenditures in current and
constant prices, inventories, advertising and pension expense, number of
patents received by date of grant and date of application, stock market
rate of return (calendar and fiscal year), and the various relevant price
indexes used in the construction of the "constant price" series. These
data are a major research asset which is also available for use by others.
3. Patents and R&D
Much of our work was devoted to using the assembled patent data to
study the R&D process and its contribution to economic growth. This is one
way of assessing the usefulness of such statistics as indicators of
inventive activity. Our work in this area can be divided, roughly, into
four categories: (1) Charac-terizing the cross-sectional and time series
6(2) Using patent renewal data to infer the distribution of patentright
values, obtain a measure of their quality and estimate their rate of
obsolescence.(3) Using stock market valuation data and data on R&D and
patents to study the effectiveness of patents as an indicator of inventive
activity. And, (4), using patent statistics in constructing and validating
measures of R&D spillovers.
Our first papers in this area were based on an earlier, smaller (but
longer) sample of firms. Pakes and Griliches (1980, l984a) estimate
something like a patent production function, focusing especially on the
degree of correlation between patent applications and past R&D expenditures
and on the lag structure of this relationship. Their main finding isa
statistically significant relationship between R&D expenditures and patent
applications. This relationship is very strong in the cross-sectional
dimension. It is weaker but still significant in the within-firm time-
series dimension (Table 4). Not only do firms that spend more on R&D
receive more patents, but also when a firmchangesits R&D expenditures,
parallel changes occur in its level of patenting. The bulk of the
relationship in the within-f iS dimension between R&D and patent
applications appears to be close to contemporaneous. The lag effects are
significant but relatively small and not well estimated (Table 5). The
significant coefficient for R&D five years back indicates, however, the
probability of a long unseen "tail" to the effect of past R&D on the level
of patenting. Pakes and Griliches interpret their estimates as implying
that patents are a fairly good indicator of differences in inventive
activity across firms, but that short-term fluctuations in their numbers
within firms have a large noise component in them. They also find that,
7—7 a-
Table4
Patents and R&D: Selected statistics associated with estiriiatiiq the equation: a
Inn: =Epyln R1_,+u11,N121,t 8, NT968.
Total Bctwcen Within
Variance in lnP 2.4! 2.24 0.17
Variance iii mR 1.72 1.68 0.04
jn F(a In 1?) 0.66 0.69 0.33 (0.23)
Lowest, median and
highest R2across
7 industry groupizws 0.74. 0.82, 0.95 0.77, 0.87, 0.97 0.11, 0.28, 0.49
(0.06, 0.16, 0.47)
' The values in parentheses are based on partiatling out time trends from both In PandIn B.
'Between' results are based on 8 year averages of all the variables across the 121 firms.
\Vithin' results are based on the annual deviations from each flrm's own average InPand lnR.
The industry groupings are Chemicals except Drugs, Drugs, Machinery except Office and
Computers, Office and Computers, Electronic Components and Communications Equipment,
Instruments, and Other. JP — adjusted partial squared multiple correlation coefficients. Ad•
justed for degrees of freedom andtheincludedcorontrend (in thetotaland ithindimensions).
From: Pakes and Griliches (1980)
-
Table 5
Patents and R&D: Distributed lag estimates in the within dimension (N=121, degree of.
freedom = 837). a
Coefficientof















a Standard errors inparentheses.
From:Pakes and Griljches (1980)except for drug firms, there has been a consistent, negative trend inthe
number of patents applied for and granted relativeto R&D expenditures
during their period of observation, 1968-1975.
In analyzing the relationship betweenpatents and R&D we encountered a
number of serious substantive and econometricproblems. The first and, at
least in retrospect, most important problem is that thesize or value of
the "output" associated with a particularpatent varies enormously over
different patents. We shall come back to thisproblem below and present
some estimates of its magnitude and its consequences forour work. The
second is that patents do not represent all of theoutput of R&D. Only a
fraction of it is patentable or patented. Moreover, thisfraction may vary
considerably over industry, firm, and time. We tried to control for such
differences in the firms' propensity to patent byusing covariance (fixed-
effects) techniques, estimating conditionally on the overallpatenting
performance of the firm, or treating them as unobservables ina multi-
equation context. We also included year effects as a partial solutionto
the problem of the changing effectiveness ofpatents as a tool of
appropriability over time.
Two other problems required the development of new econometrictools:
(1) Our Large panel is rather short becausepublic reporting of R&D
expenditures became prevalent only after 1972. Thus we have only about six
to eight years worth of data and this may be too short a timeperiod to
elicit a good estimate of the R&D to patents lag structure. And(2), the
dependent variable, patent counts, is an integer with many zeroes and is
subject to significant heteroskedasticity due to the wide sizerange of our
firms. In Pakes and Criliches (l984b) we suggest a specificprocedure for
8dealing with the first problem: truncation bias in the estimation of
distributed lag models in short panels. It is based on an explicit
modelling of the unseen pre-1972 R&D history. The integer dependent
variable problem was attacked in Hausman, Hall, and Criliches (1984) by
extending, developing, and estimating a Poisson-type stochastic
specification for our data.(This methodology was also applied in Bound et
al, 1984.) The heteroskedasticity and integer problem was also approached
via consistent non-linear estimation with robust standard errors.
Our most recent paper on the relationship between patents and R&D
(Hall, Criliches, Hausman, 1986) updates the earlier Pakes-Criliches and
Hausman-Hall-Criliches work on the Patents and R&D relationship using a
more recent and larger (but shorter) sample of firms. It uses patenting
data for 642 firms for the five years 1975-1979, and associated R&D data
for the eight years 1972-1979, and reaches one positive, one mixed, and two
essentially negative conclusions: (1) There is a strong, largely
contemporaneous relationship between R&D expenditures and patenting with an
estimated elasticity of about 0.3, which does not disappear when one
controls for the size of the firm, its permanent patenting policy, or even
the effects of its R&D history. (2) There does appear to be a small effect
of past R&D history on current patenting, on the order of 0.1-0.2, but
given the large randomness in patenting from year to year and the relative
shortness and stability of the R&D series, it is not possible to pinpoint
the exact magnitude or the timing of this effect. (3) There does not seem
to be any significant feedback from past patenting successes to future R&D
expenditure changes above and beyond their contemporaneous correlation.
This too may, however reflect the high noise ratio in our patent data
9rather than the true absence of such a relationship.(4) An interesting
finding that emerged from this study, and also Pakes' (1985) earlierwork,
has nothing to say about patenting, although itprovides one reason why it
is difficult to measure this relationship within firmsover time: The
pattern of R&D investment within a firm is essentially a random walk(or
more precisely, a martingale) with a relatively low error variance(Table
6). In other words, R&D budgets over this short horizon(eight years) are
roughly constant (in constant dollars) and therefore must be determinedby
considerations other than short run patenting successes. (5) More
generally, the small number of patents taken out by most of the firms and
their intrinsically high variability fromyear to year makes the use of
patent counts as an indicator of inventive activity in the time dimension
suspect, especially for small firms. Moreover, the rough constancy of R&D
over time makes it rather difficult to make strong inferences about them.
This does not mean that there is no interesting informationin these data,
only that one should not take small annual variations in small numberstoo
seriously, a point to which we shall return below.
4. Patents, R&D, and Stock Market Values
The second set of studies involving patents and related variablesare
connected by their use of stock market values or the stock market rate of
return as indicators of the success of inventive activity and as the
driving force behind the investments in it. The use of stock market values
as an output indicator has one major advantage. because the public-good
characteristics of inventive output make it extremely difficult tomarket,
returns to innovation are earned mostly by embodying it in a tangiblegood
10—1 Oa—
Table 6
A: Time Series Analysis of Log R&D'
642 Firms
Partial F—test for
Lag Autocorrelations AutocorrelationsEquality of the
Auto c ovarian c e
0 1.0 ——— 1.54
1 0.987(0.051) 0.992(0.002) 1.81
2 0.991(0.051) 0.054(0.035) 0.76
3 0.974(0.051) —0.009(0.034) 2.51
4 0.964(0.051) 0.017(0.034) 2.75
5 0.960(0.051) —0.036(0.032) 1.22
6 0.959(0.052) 0.006(0.032) 0.92
7 0.959(0.052) 0.055(0.123)
———
B: Estimates of Autoregressive Equations for Log R&D: 1975_19792
Equation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log R1 0.995(0.003) 0.923(0.040) 0.923(0.039) 0.915(0.040) 0.917(0.040)
Log R2 0.074(0.039) 0.082(0.053) 0.067(0.040) 0.069(0.040)
Log R3 —0.009(0.034)
Log P 0.028(0.009)
Log P1 0.002(0.011) 0.015(0.009)
Log P2 —0.012(0.009) —0.002(0.009)
Standard 0.292 0.291 0.291 0.290 0.291
Error
Notes:
1. R&D expenditures are in millions of 1972 dollars. The deflator is described in
Cummins et al, Q985).
2. All equations contain a separate intercept for each year.
3. These are tests of the stationarity assumption. We have eight estimates of the
variance, seven for the first order covariance, six for the second, and so forth.
We have added 1/3 to the patents variable before taking the logarithm due to the
presence of some zeroes.
From: Hall et al (1986).or set-vice that is then sold or traded for otherinformation that can be so
embodied. There are, therefore, no directmeasures of the value of
inventions, while indirect measures of current benefits(such as profits or
productivity) are likely to react to the output of the firm'sresearch
laboratories only slowly and erratically. On the otherhand, under
simplifying assumptions, changes in the stock market value of thefirm
should reflect (possibly with error) changes in theexpected discounted
present value of the firm's entire uncertain net cash flowstream. Thus,
if an event does occur that causes the marketto reevaluate the accumulated
output of the firm's research laboratories, its full effecton stock market
values ought to be recorded immediately. This, ofcourse, need not be
equal to the effect that will eventually materialize. The factthat we are
measuring expectations rather than realizations, however, does have its
advantages. In particular, since expectations are a major determinantof
research expenditures the use of stock market values shouldallow one to
check whether the interpretations given to theparameter estimates is
consistent with the observed behavior of these series.
Pakes (1985) uses an investment model and modern timeseries analysis
technique to interpret the dynamic relationship betweenpatents, R&D, and
the stock market rate of return. In this model,events occur which affect
the market value of a firm's R&D program and whatone estimates are the
reduced form relationships between thepercentage increase in this value
and current and subsequent changes in the firm's R&Dexpenditures, its
patent applications, and the market rate of return on its stock. His
empirical results indicate that about five percent of the variance in the
stock market rate of return is caused by the events whichchange both R&D
11and patent applications. This leads to a significant correlation between
movements in the stock market rate of return and unpredictable changesin
both patents and R&D expenditures, changes which could not be predicted
from past values of patents and R&D (See Table 7). Moreover, the parameter
values indicate that these changes in patents and R&D are associated with
large movements in stock market values. On average, an "unexpected"
increase in one patent is associated with an increase in the firm's market
value of $810,000, while an unexpected increase of $100 of R&D expenditures
is, again, on average, associated with a $1,870 increase in thevalue of
the firm. The R&D expenditure series appear to be almost error free in
this context. Patents, however, contain a significant noise component (a
component whose variance is not related to either the R&D or the stock
market rate of return series). This noise component accounts for only a
small fraction of the large differences in the number of patent
applications of different firms (about 25%), but plays a much larger role
among the smaller fluctuations that occur in the patent applicationsof a
given firm over time (about 95%). Similarily, the effect of unexpected
increases in patents on market value is highly variable. Nevertheless,
there is still some information in the time-series dimension. If we were
to observe, for example, a sudden large burst in the patent applications of
a given firm, we could be quite sure that events have occurred to cause a
large change in the market value of its R&D program; but smaller changes in
the patent applications of a given firm are not likely to be very
informative. This statement must be modified somewhat when we consider
long-term differences in the patents of a given firm (say differences over











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 caused by events that lead the market to reevaluate the firm's inventive
output during these periods.
The timing of the response of patents and R&D to events which change
the value of a firm's R&D effort is quite similar. One gets the impression
from the estimates that such events cause a chain reaction, inducing an
increase in R&D expenditures far into the future, and that fins patent
around the links of this chain almost as quickly as they are completed,
resulting in a rather close relationship between R&D expenditures and the
number of patents applied for. Perhaps surprisingly, he finds no evidence
that independent changes in the number of patents applied for (independent
of current and earlier R&D expenditures) produce significant effects on the
market's valuation of the firm (this is reflected by a lack of an
independent effect of lagged pr in the R&D equation and of q on p
in the patent equation in Table 7). The data cannot differentiate between
different kinds of events that change a firm's R&D level.
In a related paper Mairesse and Siu (1984) analyze the time-series
interrelationship between changes in the market value of the firm, sales,
R&D, and physical investment using what they call the extended accelerator
model. This paper follows the Pakes paper both in approach and in the use
of essentially the same data. It differs by not focusing, on patents,
instead adding sales and investment to the list of the series whose
interrelationship is to be examined. They find that a relatively simple
"causal" model fits their data: "innovations" in both market value and
sales "cause" subsequent R&D and investment changes without further
feedback from R&D or investment to either the stock market rate of returns
or sales. There is little evidence of a strong feedback relationship
13between physical and R&D investment,though there is some evidence of
contemporaneous interaction. An interesting conclusionof their paper is
that independent changes in salesexplain a significant fraction of the
changs in R&D (and physical investment) above andbeyond what is already
explained by changes in the market value of thefirm and by lagged
movements in R&D itself, implying that byusing different variables one
might be able to separate out the effects of differentkinds of shocks in
the R&D process. This finding could, ofcourse, be just a reflection of a
substantial noise (error) level in the observedfluctuations of the stock
market rate of return, in the sense thatnot all of the changes in the
market value of a firm are relevant toinvestment decisions.
Ben-Zion (1984) examines the cross-sectionaldeterminants of market
value, following an approach similar to that outlinedin Criliches (1981).
It differs by not allowing for specific firmconstants and by including
other variables, such as earnings andphysical investment, in the same
equation. He also finds that R&D and patentsare significant in explaining
the variability of market value (relativeto the book value of its assets),
in addition to such other variablesas earnings. His most interest-ing
finding, from our point of view, is the relativeimportance of total
patents taken out in the industry as a whole on the firm'sown market
value. In his interpretation, patents applied forindicate new
technological opportunities in the industry, and these overall
opportunities may be more important than a firm's own recent
accomplishments, though here again this could arise just from thehigh
error rate in the firm's own patent counts as an indicator ofits own
inyentive potential.
14This set of papers clearly opens up an interesting research areabut
still leaves many issues unresolved. Like the proverbial research on the
characteristics of an elephant, different papers approach this topic from
slightly different points of view. Pakes analyzes movements in patents,
R&D, and market value; Mairesse and Siu investigate the relationship
between R&D, investment, sales, and market value; while Ben-Zion (in his
change regressions) looks at R&D, earnings, and market value.
In principle, one would like to use modern time series techniques
together with some of the testable implications of recent investment theory
to separate out the timing in the relationships between these variables and
to consider disturbances processes that intercede between them. One of the
conclusions of the Pakes paper, however, was that to separate out
successfully the effects of different kinds of events on inventive activity
will require a larger model and more indicator variables than were used
heretofore. Especially distressing was his inability to distinguish
between demand shocks, where demand shocks are loosely defined as events
which cause increases in patenting only through the R&D expenditures they
induce, and technological or supply shocks which may have a direct effect
on patents as well as an indirect effect via induced R&D demand. A model
capable of distinguishing between these shocks requires the addition of
variables which react differently to such events. A prototype of such a
model is outlined in Griliches, Hall and Pakes (1986), where the results of
a replication of some of Pakes (1985) computations for a larger sample and
an expan-sion of his equation system to add equations for sales,
employment, and investment are also reported. They indicate that the
addition of the latter variables is helpful, in the sense that fluctuations
15in their growth rates are related to fluctuations inboth the growth rate
of R&D and the stock market rate of return and henceshould help in
identifying the relationships we are interested in. On the otherhand, the
expansion of the sample to include many small finns with low levelsof
patenting, deteriorates significantly the informational content of this
variable, raising its noise to signal ratio, and making it hardto discern
a feedback from the independent variability in patenting toany of the
other variables. Thus, at the moment, it does not lookas if the data can
sustain a model with two separate factors ("market" and"technological"
innovations), even though in principle such a model should be identifiable
in this kind of data and with this number of variables.
The difficulties in implementing such models ariseto a large extent
from the large "noise" component in patents as indicators ofR&D output in
the short-rim within-firm dimension. While we wereaware of the problem
from the beginning, it was the work of Pakes and Schankerman(1984), which
we turn to next, and their estimates of the dispersion ofpatent values
which alerted us to its actual magnitude. Using their numbersGriliches,
Hall, and Pakes (1986) estimate that though unexpected changes in the
present value of R&D output can account only for about onepercent of the
variation in the stock market value of a firm fromyear to year and that
the proportion that is accountable by unexpectedchanges in the number of
patents is even smaller (less than 0.1 percent). Thus, it is not
surprising that it is difficult to use patent data to separate out demand
from supply shocks and follow these effects over time.
5. Patent Renewal Data
16In many countries and recently also in the U.S., holders of patents
must pay an annual renewal fee in order to keep their patents in force. If
the renewal fee is not paid in any single year the patent is permanently
cancelled. Assuming that renewal decisions are based on economic criteria,
agents will only renew their patents if the value of holding them over an
additional year exceeds the cost of such renewal. Observations on the
proportion of patents that are renewed at alternative ages, together with
the relevant renewal fee schedules, will then contain information on the
distribution of the holding values of patents, and on the evolution of this
distribution function over the lifespan of the patents. Since patent
rights are seldom marketed, this is one of the few sources of information
on their value. In a series of papers Fakes and Schanlcennan (1984), Fakes
(1986), and Schankerman and Fakes (1986) present and estimate models which
allow them to recover the distribution of returns from holding patents at
each age over their lifespan. Since the renewal decision is based on the
value of patent protection to the patentee, the procedure used in these
articles directly estimates the private value of the benefits derived from
the patent laws. Estimates of the distribution of these benefits at an
economy-wide level of aggregation, and of movements in them over the post-
1950 period are also obtained.
In addition, these patent renewal models imply that ideas for which
patent protection is more valuable will tend to be protected by payment of
renewal fees for longer periods of time. This suggests using the patent
renewal data to construct an index of the average value, or quality, of the
ideas embodied in patents, and then using this index to supplement the
quantity-based patent count data in constructing more comprehensive and
17accurate measures of the value of patented output. There are two reasons
why an index of the value of patented ideas should prove useful. First,
the average value of patented inventions may differamong groups of
patentees or over time periods, so that differences in the number of
patents among groups or time periods will provide systematically biased
estimates of differences in their value. Second, both small sample case
studies and larger sample econometric evidence indicate that the
distribution of the value of patented ideas is very dispersed and highly
skewed (see below for details). This implies that the "noise to signal"
ratio in the patent count variable as a measure of the value of patented
ideas is large. Provided that differently valued patents are renewed for
different lengths of time, the renewal data allow us to construct an
indicator of the value of patented output with a lower noise to signal
ratio than that of the patent count index alone. We illustrate these two
uses of the renewal data below.
In Pakes (1986) patent holders are allowed to be uncertain about the
sequence of returns that will accrue to the patent if it is to be kept in
force. This uncertainty is introducted to allow for the fact that agents
often apply for patents at an early stage in the innovation process, a
stage in which the agent is still exploring alternative opportunities for
earning returns from the information embodied in the patented idea. Early
patenting arises in part from the incentive structure created by the patent
system, since, if the agent does not patent the information available to
him, somebody else might. This incentive is reinforced by the fact that
the renewal fees in all countries studied are quite small during the early
years of a patent's life.
18A patent holder who pays the renewal fee obtains both the current
returns that accrue to the patent over the coming period, and the option to
pay the renewal fee and maintain the patent in force in the following
period should he desire to do so. An agent who acts optimally will pay the
renewal fee only if the sum of the current returns plus the value of this
option exceeds the renewal fee. It is assumed that the agent values the
option at the expected discounted value of future net returns (current
returns minus renewal fees), taking account of the fact that an optimal
policy will be followed in each future period, and conditional on the
information currently at the disposal of the agent. An optimal sequential
policy for the agent has the form of an optimal renewal (or stopping) rule;
a rule determining whether to pay the renewal fee at each age. The
proportion of patents which drop out at age a corresponds to the
proportion of patents which do not satisfy the renewal criteria at that age
but did so at age a-I. The drop out proportions predicted by the model are
a function of the model's parameter values and of the renewal fee schedule. The
data gives us the actual proportion of drop outs. The estimation problem
consists, roughly speaking, of finding those values of the model's
parameters which make the drop out proportions implied by the model as
"close" as possible to those we actually observe.
The empirical results from the Pakes (1986) paper indicate that
patents are applied for at an early stage in the inventive process, a stage
in which there is still substantial uncertainty concerning both the returns
that will be earned from holding the patents, and the returns that will
accrue to the patented ideas. Gradually the patentors uncover more
information about the actual value of their patents. Most turn out to be
19of little value, but the rare "winner" justifies the investments that were
made in developing them.Ills estimates imply also that most of the
uncertainty with respect to the value of a patent is resolved during the
first three or four years of its life.Using this result, Schankerman and
Pakes (1986) employ a simpler but more detailed model to examine changes in
the distribution of patent values over time and the correlates of these
changes. The substantive results from these papers imply that the average
value of a patent right is quite small, about $7,000 in the population of
patent applications in France and the UK. In Germany, where only about 35
percent of all patent applications are granted (about 93% and 83% were
granted in France and the UK respectively), the average value of a patent
right among grants was about $17,000. The distribution of these values,
however, is very dispersed and skewed. One percent of patent applications
in France and the 13K had values in excess of $70,000 while in Germany one
percent of patents granted had values in excess of $120,000. Moreover,
half of all the estimated value of patent rights accrues to between five
and ten percent of all the patents. The annual returns to patent
protection decay rather quickly over time, with rates of obsolescence on
the order of 10 to 20 percent per year. Since about 35,000 patent were
applied for per year in France and the UK and about 60,000 in Germany,
these figures imply that though the aggregate value of patent rights is
quite large, it is only on the order of ten to fifteen percent of the total
national expenditures on R&D. While these returns (which are the result of
the proprietary right created by the patent laws) may, depending on the
response elasticity of R&D investments to such incentives, stimulate a
large amount of R&D investment, it is clear that other means of
20appropriating the benefits of R&D must be quite important.
Even though the total number of patent applications fell during the
1970s, one should not take this decline in numbers as implying,
necessarily, the exhaustion of technological opportunities. Schankerman
and Pakes find that although the numbers of patents per scientist and
engineer fell sharply, their estimated "quality-adjusted" total value of
patent rights per scientist and engineer was remarkably stable over the
period examined by them (Table 8). One final point. Disaggregated
patent renewal data are gathered by the International Patent Documentation
Center (INPADOC). These data would allow one to investigate the returns to
patent protection separately by technical field of the patent and by the
nationality and type of patentor (e.g., individuals and small business
enterprises vs large corporate entities). Issues related to which sectors
of a particular economy, and which economies, derive disproportionate
benefits from the patent laws lie at the heart of most discussions of cost
and benefits of alternative patent systems (see Scherer, 1965, Chapter 16,
and the literature cited there.) Moreover, inter-sectoral differences in
the patenting and R&D processes are central to the literature on market
structure, industrial policy, and technical progress. Thus, future studies
using these data could be very interesting and should be encouraged.
6. The Spillover Effects of R&D
One of the major unresolved issues in this area of research is the
identification and measurement of R&D spillovers, the benefits that one
company or industry receives from the R&D activity of another. It is










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 about who are the potential beneficiaries of whose research. One of the
ways we have been trying to approach this problem is by using the detailed
information on patenting by type of patent (patent class) to cluster firms
into common "technological activity" clusters and looking whether a firm's
variables are related to the overall activity levels of its cluster.
In his thesis and several recent papers, Adam Jaffe (1983, 1984,
1985, 1986) has used firm level data on patenting by class of patent and on
the distribution of sales by 4-digit SIC to cluster 500+ of our panel firms
into 21 distinct technological clusters and 20 industry (sales orientation)
clusters. It turns out that these two clustering criteria lead to
different clusterings. Using the technological clusters Jaffe constructed
a measure of the total R&D "pool" available for spillovers (borrowing or
stealing) in a cluster. He then looked at three "outcome" variables: R&D
investment ratio for the firm (in 1976), patents received (average number
applied for during 1975-1977), and output growth between 1972 and 1977. In
each of these cases, his measure of the R&D pool contributed significantly
and positively to the explanation of the firm level "outcome" variables
even in the presence of industry dummies (based on the sales clustering).
Not surprisingly, perhaps, firms in technological clusters with large
overall R&D "pools" invested more intensively in R&D than would be
predicted just from their industrial (SIC) location. More interesting is
the finding that firms received more patents per R&D dollar in clusters
where more R&D was performed by others, again above and beyond any pure
industry differences (based on a classification of their sales). (See Table
9.) Similarly, his analysis of firm productivity growth during the 1972-
1977 period showed that it was related positively to both the average R&D
22—22a-
TABLE9
PATENT EQUATION ESTIMATION RESULTS
NON—LINEAR TWO—STAGE LEAST SQUARES (1976 CROSS—SECTION)
DependentVariable: Log of Average Patents Applied for,1975—1977
.1 a a
Log(R&D)(8) .9140 .961 .937 —2.09
(.o3L) (.olcr) (.070) (.214)
R&D Elasticity




R&D—Pool Interaction (a) .361
(.072)
WithinClugter .763 .67o
Premium (6) (.364) (.371)
x—statlstic for the signi—n.i. 53.6 39.2 ficance of technological
cluster effects
Root mean square error .943 .913 .862 .923
Notes: 537 observations. Numbers in parentheses inder coefficients are hetero—
skedasticity consistent standard errors; x statistics are not corrected
for heteroskedasticity. R&D elasticity is calculated for comparison to other
equations. For this purpose, the pool variables are evaluated at the mean of
the data.
C T
"Pool"=+ós. s —weightedR&D of "others". C —weightedR&D of
others within the same technological cluster.n.i. —notincluded.
The99.5% critical value for is 39.9.
From: Jaffe (1985)intensity of the individual firms and the change in the size of the R&D
pool available to these firms (Table 10). The magnitude and significance
of these effects is robust, allowing also for industry based differences in
average rates of productivity growth. In terms of profits, or market
value, however, there are both positive and negative effects of neighboring
firms' R&D. The net effect is positive for high R&Dfirms,but firms with
R&D about one standard deviation below the mean are made worse off overall
by the R&D of others. More generally, the idea of R&D spillovers is made
operationalby using the information in the patenting patterns of firms to
construct a measure of their position in "technological space" and of the
closenessbetween them and it is shown that this position has an observable
impact on the fin's success.
7.Summary
In this paper we describe a number of studies whose common denominator
is the use of patent statistics to illuminate the process of innovation and
technical change. One of the main findings of this project was the
discovery of a strong relationship in the cross-sectional dimension.
Patents are a good indicator of differences in inventive activity across
different firms. While the propensity to patent differs significantly
across industries, the relationship between R&D and patents is close to
proportional, especially for firms above a minimal size. Small firms do
receive a significantly higher number of patents per R&D dollar but this
can be explained largely by their being a much more highly selected group.
(To be in our sample a small firm must be successful enough to have
publicly traded securities.) There is also a statistically significant
relationship between R&D and patents in the within-firm time-series
23—2 Ia—
TABLE 10
RESULTS OF SALES EQUATIO?J ESTIMATION—R&D FORM
(Differences, 1977 —1972)
DependentVariable: Log(Deflated 1977 Sales) —Log(Deflated1972 Sales)
I a I
Log(Employment) .721 .692 .690 .681
(.o14) (.038) (.033) (.033)
ALog(Net Plant) .037 .127 .138 .155
(.o14) (.o14) (.031) (.032)
R&D/Sales 1.98 1.145 1.08 1.26
(.i) (.146) (.28) (.52)
Log(C1uster Pool Stock) .0141 .098 .158 .176
(.0149) (.051) (.038) (.0145)
40ut of Cluster Pool Stock
000 00011 " Cluster Pool Stock
(.00029) (.00028) (.0005k) (.00052)
F—statistic on Industry n.j. 6. n.j. 2.1
Effects (18,1403) (18,383)
F—statistic on Technological fl.i. n.j. 5.8 1.9
Area Effects
(20,1401) (20,383)
.6i8 .702 .703 .732
Root mean square error .191 .172 .172 .167
Notes: 14314 observations. Numbers in parentheses under coef-
ficients are heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors
F—statistics are not
corrected for heteroskedasticity. n-i.—— not included.
F critical values: .95 .99
(20,1400) 1.6 1.9
(50,1400) 1.14 1.6
From: Jaffe, A., 1985
- -dimension, but it is weaker there. The bulk of the observable effect is
contemporeneous. There is some evidence that history also matters, that
there are some lagged effects, but they seem to be small and difficult to
estimate precisely. These findings can also be interpreted as implying
some reverse causality: successful research leads both to patents and to a
counnitment of additional funds for the development of resulting ideas.
Using data on patent renewal rates and patent renewal fees in selected
European countries we have estimated the private value of patent rights,
their dispersion, and their decay over time. The average value of patent
rights is quite small, about $7,000 and $17,000 per patent in France and
Germany respectively. It is also very variable and its distribution is
quite skewed. While most patent rights were close to worthless, one
percent of them had values in excess of $70,000 and $120,000 per patent in
France and Germany respectively. These returns were estimated, however, to
decline rather rapidly over time, with rates of obsolesence between 10 and
20 percent per year. While the aggregate value of patent rights appears to
be quite high, it is estimated to be only on the order of 10 to 15 percent
of total national expenditures on R&D. Hence it is unlikely to be the
major factor in determining the overall level of such expenditures. Using
these newly developed methods of analysis we show that even though the
total number of patent applications fell during the 1970s, their estimated
"quality" rose, implying that one cannot take the observed decline in
numbers as indicating, necessarily, the exhaustion of technological
opportunities. The finding of extreme skewness in the distribution of the
value of patent rights has, however, pessimistic implications for the use
of patent counts as indicators of short run changes in the output of R&D.
24Nevertheless, patent data represent a valuable resource for the
analysis of the process of technical change. There are other ways of using
them besides simply counting them. It is possible to use a firm's
distribution of patenting by field to infer the position of its R&Dprogram
in "technological space" and to use this information, in turn, to study how
the results of R&D spillover from one firm to another and to illuminate the
process of strategic rivalry that the firm finds itself in. If, as is now
happening also in the U.S., patent renewal information were to become
available at the individual patent and firm level, one could use these data
together with information on patent citations to construct more relevant
"quality weighted" inventive "output" measures. Even without going that
far, the currently available patent data can be used to study longer-run
interfirm differences in levels of inventive activity and as a substitute
for R&D data where they are not available in the desired detail.
25Footnotes
*We are indebted to our collaborators for many contributions to the
work discussed here and to the National Science Foundation (50C78-04279,
PRA79-13740, PRA81-08635, and PRA8S-l2758) and the NEER for financial
support.
References
Addanki, S .,"R&D,Innovationand Mergers", Harvard University,
Ph.D. Thesis, 1986.
Ben-Zion, U., "R&D and Investment Decisions and Their
Relationship to Stock Market Values and Sales: Preliminary
Results," in Z. Griliches (ed.), R&D, Patents, and
Productivity, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984.
Bound, J. ,C.Cummins, Z. Griliches, B.H. Hall, and A. Jaffe, "Who
Does R&D and Who Patents?", in Z. Griliches (ed.),R&D,
Patents, and Productivity, Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1984.
Cummins, C., B.H. Hall, E.S. Laderman and J. Mundy, "The R&D
Master File: Documentation," September 1985, unpublished.
Griliches, Z .,"MarketValue, R&D, and Patents, Economics Letters
7, 1981. Reprinted in Z. Griliches (ed.) R&D, Patents, and
Productivity, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984.
"Introduction" in Z. Crutches (ed.), R&D, Patents,
26and Productivity. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1984.
__________(ed.),R&D, Patents, and Productivity, Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1984.
"Productivity, R&D and Basic Research at the Firm
Level in the 197Os,' American Economic Review, 1986.
Griliches, Z., LII. Hall and A. Palces, "Is There a Second
(Technological Opportunity) Factor?", 1986, unpublished.
Griliches, Z. and J. Mairesse, "Productivity and R&D at the Firm
Level," in Z. Criliches (ed.) R&D, Patents, and Productivity,
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984.
____________________________"R&Dand Productivity Growth:
Comparing Japanese and U.S. Manufacturing Firms)" NBER
Working Paper No. 1778.
Hall, BA-I., "The Relationship Between Firm Size and Firm Growth
in the U.S. Manufacturing Sector," NBER Working Paper No.
1965, December 1985.
Hall, B.H,, Z. Griliches and J.A. Hausman, "Patents and R&D: Is
There a Lag?", International Economic Review, 1986.
Hausman, J., B.H. Hall and Z. Griliches, "Econometric Models
for Count Data with an Application to the Patents-R&D
Relationship," Econometrica, 52(4), July, 1984.
Jaffe, A .,"Using Patent Class Data to Measure Technological
Proximity and Research Spillovers Among Firms," Harvard
University, 1983, unpublished.
__________"TheEffects of Market Demand, Technological Opportunity
and Research Spillovers on R&D Intensity and Productivity
27Crowth,' NER Working Paper No. 1432, 1984.
_________"Quantifyingthe Effects of Technological Opportunity
and Research Spillovers in Industrial Innovation," Ph.D.
Thesis, 1-larvard University, 1985.
_________"TechnologicalOpportunity and Spillovers of R&D:
Evidence from Firm's Patents, Profits and Market Value,"
NBER Working Paper No. 1815, 1986, forthcoming in American
Economic Review
Mairesse, 3. and A. Siu, "An Extended Accelerator Model of R&D
and Physical Investment," in Z. Criliches (ed.), R&D,
Patents, and Productivity, Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1984.
Pakes, A., "On Patents, R&D, and the Stock Market Rate of
Return," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 93, No. 2,
April 1985.
_________"Patentsas Options: Some Estimates of the Value of
Holding European Patent Stocks," Econometrica, 54(4),
July 1986.
Pakes, A. and 1. Criliches, "Patents and R&D at the Firm Level:
A First Report," Economics Letters 5, 377-381, 1980.
_________________________"Patentsand R&D at the Firm Level:
A First Look," in Zvi Criliches (ed.) R&D, Patents, and
Productivity, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984a.
___________________________"EstimatingDistributed Lags in
Short Panels with an Application to the Specification of
Depreciation Patterns and Capital Stock Constructs,"
28Review of Economic Studies, Vol. LI(2), No. 165, April
1984b.
Pakes, A. and N. Schankerutan, "The Rate of Obsolescence of
Knowledge, ,ResearchGestation Lags, and the Private Rate of
Return to Research Resources," in Z. Griliches (ed.), R&D,
Patents, and Productivity, Chicago: University of Chicago,
1984.
Schankerman, M., and A. Pakes, "Estimates of the Value of Patent
Rights in European Countries During the Post-1950 Period,"
Economic Journal, 1986.
Scherer, F.M., Industrial Market Structure and Economic
Performance, 1965. 2nd edition. Rand McNally College
Publishing Company, Chicago.
29Appendix
The Compustat-OTAF Patents Match
In accomplishing this match the major problem we faced was that the
OTAF tapes do not have CUSIP numbers (the identifying corporation code on
the Compustat Tapes). They list only the names of individuals and
organizations, of which there were 66,000 or more distinct ones and among
which we needed to find our 2700 firm names. The work that had to be done
is described in more detail in Cummins et al (1985). Basically, we had
first to find all (or most) of the subsidiaries of our 2,700 companies and
enter all of their distinct names, 16,000 of them, into the computer; write
and run a lexicographical search and match computer program that would
assign OTAF names to the Compustat firms; check the results manually;
investigate the many discrepancies and resolve various conflicts. The
first round of the match yielded about 4,500 OTAF organizations to
associate with 1,500 of our firms. After checking the list of patenting
organizations with at least five patents in the 11 year period from 1969
through 1979 we found that approximately 8,000 organizations remained which
were not matched to the firms in our sample. Based on a sample, about a
third of those appeared to be foreign firms and another third remained
unidentified after looking them up in the 1981 Directory of Corporate
Affiliations.To reduce the number of firms which had to be investigated
by hand, we restricted the sample of unmatched organizations to those with
more than 50 patents in the 11 year period or at least five patents in the
period 1975 to 1977. Of these 900 organizations, a third were matched to
30our sample or otherwise disposed of. The remaining largest unmatched
organizations turned out to be agencies of the U.S. Government, several
privately-held companies, and a few service companies which obtained
patents for inventors.
31